Bianculli, AC () Negotiating Trade Liberalization in Argentina and Chile: When Fulquet, G () El Proyecto Educativo Para El MERCOSUR Y Los Debates En Torno . Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. . Journals A-Z. editing, and Michelle Furman for her excellent design work. Joseph S. Tulchin resistance of Mercosur countries, particularly Brazil and Argentina: the launching Red de Investigaciones Económicas del Mercosur, Edificio Mercosur,. Piso 3. Alaska, Arizona (a minimum of 10 US citizens is required, the majority of them . Tucson: University of Arizona Press. “Etnografía del Budismo Zen Argentino: Ritual, Cuerpo y Poder en la “Nuevas religiones japonesas en el Mercosur: La Transnacionalización Ignorada. Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental.

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Commitments on National Treatment. In addition, the extended regulations which typically characterize the service sector demanded a significant effort to understand their meaning and significance from the standpoint of market access and national treatment. Domestic data and telex transmission, electronic mail, voice mail and electronic data interchange were editogial with no restrictions.

Apart from the role of domestic interest groups, multilateral trade negotiations can also be regarded as mercosurr strategic game in which governments look for reciprocal concessions. The US administration did not push for negotiations in coastal maritime services and air transportation either.

Argentina fits in this category, since it was both an exporter of temperate agricultural products and an active member of the Cairns group. In contrast to the GATT agreement, negotiating the GATS required close co-operation argentiba different governmental agencies and an adequate understanding of a regime still in the making.

Strategic considerations or domestic group pressures may have played a role in insurance commitments. Apparently, the presentation of the telecommunications list of offers by Argentina was used by the local negotiators to try to extract some bilateral concessions from the United States on selected products.


Consequently, in the aa of Chile market access commitments were concentrated in only five sectors business services, communications, financial services, tourism and transportation. Similarly, there may have existed strong bargaining considerations for upholding concessions in order to extract more reciprocal benefits in the future. Many public officials interviewed underlined that one of the major obstacles faced was not so much that of gathering the required normative information, but interpreting it in the light of what was necessary to build a national list of commitments.

Number of no-restriction commitments. In the next section we examine the broad evidence on the content of the Argentine list of offers, before turning to the issue of what may have accounted for the outcome. Based on Berlinski and Romero According to various edotorial, meetings organized to gather information to build the Argentine offer frequently ended in a list of demands over domestic policies such as tax policy rather than international negotiations.

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The GATS was regarded as something distant and unrelated to business concerns, probably increasing the discretion of national authorities. The number of commitments negotiated was higher than in the case of Chile and slightly higher than Brazil. Most negotiators interviewed referred to argwntina limited engagement of the private sector and the lack of technical preparation and understanding of the GATS.

Section briefly summarizes the factors that can shape trade policy formation. In the case of communications Argentina undertook commitments for approximately two-thirds of the total number of negotiable items. Apart from that novelty, services negotiations were characterized by inherent complexities. Placing bargaining or strategic considerations in a secondary place as opposed to unilateral reforms may be justified on efficiency arentina.


A number of specific market access problems were identified in areas such as construction and consulting especially in Brazilbut a decision was made to take these issues to the sub-regional rather than the multilateral negotiating table. Doing this work ideally required multi-agency teams of highly trained personnel, which were frequently scarce. At first sight, the Argentine aargentina does not seem to fit well with any of these explanations. Instead of stating this limitation, the Argentine authorities opted for mercoskr horizontal exclusion.

Moreover, in areas where there was not a single responsible agency such as business servicesthe task force had to engage directly in identifying existing regulations and drawing direct inputs from the private sector such as medcosur associations.

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This approach argntina reduce leverage in future multilateral as well as preferential negotiations, as shown by intra-Mercosur negotiations and other inter-regional preferential negotiations, such as that between Mercosur and the European Union. Mode of supply 3 was restrained by the suspension of new authorizations for establishment removed in In distribution services, Argentina bound with no restrictions retailing and wholesale trade services and franchising.

Tourism and travel services, at last, were bound with no restrictions.

Based on Berlinski y Romero In effect, while Argentina bound Social and healthcare services not included in 1. Argentina undertook no market access and national treatment commitments in six sectors, namely education; environment; social and healthcare; recreation, culture and sport; transport; and other services.